Summary and Concluding Remarks from the Supranational Democracy Dialogue 2020

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The Supranational Democracy Dialogues II (hereinafter “SDDII”) of 2020 is the second edition of a successful two-day event that took place in Lecce (Italy) in April 2018, at the end of which all the speakers and the majority among the organizers and the attendees decided to write and sign a “Manifesto for Supranational Democracy”.

The statements included in that act represented the summary and the shared conclusions of all the presentations and all the matters discussed in the SDD. It promotes, namely, the need for democratic institutions at all levels, from the local to the global, as well as the development of an inclusive dialogue about global democracy among all human beings, the raise of awareness among citizens, communities and populations and the support of democratic solutions to global challenges.

Unfortunately, after having completely organized the second edition event, originally scheduled for April 16th and 17th, 2020 in Brindisi (Italy), the Organizing Committee had to temporarily cancel it because of the COVID-19 pandemic, only to then rethink and reprogram it as a series of webinars.

The first webinar, entitled “European Union: improving democracy and participation”, took place on May 9th, on Europe Day, in 2020 also celebrating the 70th anniversary of the Shuman Declaration. The other meetings followed, precisely, on May 15th (“Rethinking global rules and institutions”), on May 22th (“European Union: improving economic governance and solidarity”), on May 25th (“Shifting the paradigm: new cultural models, new awareness”) and finally on May 29th (“Shifting the paradigm II: new rules for the world order”). The full playlist of the event is on the YouTube Channel of Università del Salento, here.

Panelists came from different backgrounds and paths of life: academia, civil society, activism, business/corporate environment, international institutions. They met in 5 webinars under the label Supranational Democracy Dialogue, to present different visions and perspectives on the future with a constructive approach. They offer an example of how a global political sphere and global political discourse could look like. It is impossible to condense so many diverse contributions in a single vision.

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All the panelists agreed on that: the state of the world may be improved and mankind can be in the near future far better than it is now. The international community should avoid getting out of the pandemic and back to the previous state of the world. A number of issues need to be addressed without delay, among them, are:

– A non-sustainable relationship with nature, a current model based on exploitation;

– Inequalities, fostered by an unfair system of tax -avoidance made possible by competition among states as well as by fight  for control over natural resources in the interest of the few;

– lack or inadequacy of policies implementing shared values, as the fundamental human rights, at the global level and SDGs.

Yet, a double paradigm shift is required: a paradigm shift in cultural models and awareness and a second one concerning global rules and institutions. New technologies may help, but just as tools serving clear purpose-driven goals.

The human species could be able to live as part of an ecosystem where all other species equally thrive, in harmony with nature and as part of nature. Education may encourage the development of creative and critical thinking, contributing to prepare global citizens to take full responsibility for the planet and empowering them. The economy may serve the collective good while serving entrepreneurs and workers. Leaders should be in service of their communities and offer the example of compassionate and mindful leadership.

Ideas and Proposals for the Global Governance

The international community could take this incredible opportunity to move towards more sustainable standards in the relation between human species and the environment and towards more cooperative and supportive global governance. Panelists, in different ways, all supported a more democratic model for global governance, empowering individuals, also in the aggregate form of civil society, to have a meaningful say over issues affecting their existence. They could do so in participating in negotiations, having a dialogue (or being represented) within global institutions, ultimately be part of a new “omnilateral” vision of international relations. Such a model would better pursue the goal of reducing inequality and fostering inclusiveness and gender equality.

 UN or a new international organization could be in charge of the management of crises. The existing global institutions could be reformed – WHO for instance could raise a little tax and then provide for free patents and coordinated solutions – international agreements could oblige companies and states to internalize costs for environmental damage. Simultaneous national policies could provide a frameworks solution; a point for a global government instead of global governance was made as well. Whatever the chosen solutions, the need for global solutions to global issues was stressed as well as the need for legitimacy and representation, for instance through parliamentary bodies (as the suggested UNPA), or by online open consultations, or other tools yet to be invented. The global governance should be part of multilevel governance, where all levels – even the smaller as the local community – is empowered and responsible. 

All levels have to be accountable to citizens and this is especially important for the global one, now escaping any kind of accountability. Inclusiveness has to be cultivated through education, access to the internet, and easily usable tools for participation at all levels. National judges are on the frontline to make common rules enforced also at the national and local levels.

Many suggestions emerged during the five webinars. Some are ready to use:

– the two proposals from Petter Ollmunger (Democracy without borders): (i) establishing a UN parliamentary assembly and (ii) introducing a proposal initiative from the citizens of the United Nations. Both of them do not require a UN Charter review process.

– the proposal by Jerome Bellion-Jourdan of an International Negotiation Platform, which is on its way shortly after “Exploratory talks” convened by the Graduate Institute’s Global Governance Centre, in cooperation with Executive Education.

Most of the proposals require instead a medium or long-term approach as the convening of a global intergovernmental conference to reformulate – among the willing – some key points in global collaboration and governance. Such a process should involve as well civil society, local governments, indigenous communities, and all the other key stakeholders. Some more sectoral goals could be put right now on the agenda of specialized agencies, like UNESCO, WHO, UNEA.

Ideas and Proposals for European Governance

the speakers commented on the European Union response as well as the Member States’ reactions to the pandemic crisis and also the effects that all the measures adopted at all levels would engender to the democratic order and the economic governance.

Due to the emergency, all the democratic institutions at the national level dealt with an unprecedented global and health crisis. This crisis could have been a moment of solidarity and cohesion where a temporary deviation of democratic rules and an equally temporary limitation of human rights could have been justified. Some problems appeared regarding the reactions to these deviations coming from citizens, political parties, and the Member States.

In the European Union, in one hand, most of the economic resources that have been spent came from the Member States. The problem is that within the EU, there are still different spending capacities between the Member States and, in the long term, these differences could create distortions in the internal market. The COVID-19 is going to become an accelerator of the existent divergences, separations, and gaps between States. What the EU needs is a common approach, a common instrument to face this unprecedented crisis, which has hit all countries in a symmetric way.

On the other hand, the European Union contributions consisted, above all, in suspending the application of the stability and growth pact and in suspending the application of the State aid rules.

The S.U.R.E. (Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency) is a temporary measure, which includes some conditions concerning the destination of the resources. Furthermore, the Commission’s proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic (COM(2020)441final of 28.05.2020) has been based on art. 122 TFEU, which suggests the temporary and exceptional nature of the measure.

Some speakers proposed to transform the European Stability Mechanism (E.S.M.) into a European development fund (inspired by the Italian “Cassa Depositi e Prestiti”) to be used in the next ten years to finance the long-term investments for local systems, in order to bring the EU citizens closer to the European institutions.

Despite some speakers showed concerns relating to radical institutional reforms in the EU legal order, all of them agreed that the European decision-makers should, at this moment, make important steps in order to avoid the EU going down or, worst, becoming dysfunctional. In particular, all the panelists considered as necessary to abolish unanimity because democracy could not be complete as long as veto powers are subsisting in the decision-making process.

Furthermore, other interventions have to be done in the EU legal system, such as the implementation of transparency in the decision-making process, for example by implementing the possibility for all citizens to access to relevant documents. It has been enlightened how, in this context, the efficiency of the decision-making process had been used as a justification for denying access to documents, above all to those related to the legislative procedure, and this practice cannot be accepted.

Different proposals came up in the discussion concerning the improvement of the participatory democracy in the EU. On one hand, it has been stressed out how important could be the contribution of the European Parliament in promoting the follow-up of a successful European citizens’ initiative: doing this the European Commission would face a twofold encouragement to consider the content of the initiative, but also it has been underlined how important could be in shaping inclusive participation to press the European Commission to motivate in an appropriate manner any rejection to follow a successful ECI up.

Furthermore, there have been some speakers who considered the idea of giving citizens the possibility not just to present “appropriate proposals” to the European Commission, but also to submit amendments to pending legislative measures and to guarantee a role for civil society in the informal negotiations of legislative acts. Others underlined the importance of the citizens’ participation in the sense of bringing constant points of view to the attention of the decision-makers, without complicating the decision making structures. Another important point of discussion has been the implementation of the democratic participation of citizens at all levels, also by promoting the use of new technologies in all the sectors that are relevant to democracy where technologies can actually improve information and participation.

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Some interesting considerations have been collected among the youngest participants to the webinars: high school students.

The most relevant and surprising fact came from their participation in the discussion, despite their young age, was their awareness of the connection between all people and between States as well as the importance of a shared response to all the global challenges.

They proposed the promotion and the improvement of the participation of local authorities and municipalities, which can better represent the local community into the global discussion.

They also underlined the strategic role of technologies in shaping the future of democracy and the importance of governmental intervention in order to prevent all the negative effects deriving from cyber attacks and from fake news, because, as they stressed, otherwise technologies will bring much more distances than closeness in the future.

 

Susanna Cafaro and Stefania Attolini

May 9, Europe Day

On May 9, 1950, 70 years ago, a brave man, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman proposed a radically new solution to an old problem.

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Schuman had the courage to think outside the box and above all to listen to a man with a good idea, Jean Monnet, who – without no institutional or political role – reached out to present his solution.

The problem was the control over disputed territories on the border between France and Germany, rich in mineral resources, coal and iron, strategic for the economy in times of peace and even more in times of war

The idea was to “de-nationalize” them: entrusting them to an independent authority under political shared control (ministerial and parliamentary) and under Judicial control. Ownership and national territories would have remained just the same, yet regulation and access would have been uniform and non-discriminatory. A simple, but a disruptive idea in comparison with the logic of borders and alliances than dominating international relations.

Schuman’s speech on 9 May was intended as addressed first of all to Germany, but it was open to other interested governments.

Schuman’s speech was about concrete achievements, step by step, intended to rise solidarity among the people, but it of done, but it drew, as well, a long-term vision of a united continent after centuries of war.

Pragmatism and idealism, hand in hand.

On Europe’s day, we discuss a short and long term vision for it

The full recording of the webinar is online on the YouTube Channel of Università del Salento at this address: https://youtu.be/x8KmXlAxy1g

Here are the links to the four next webinars in the series , feel free to share them
 
 
 
 
 
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A EUROPEAN ANSWER TO THE CORONAVIRUS THREAT TO PROVE THAT THE EU IS A TRUE COMMUNITY WITH A SHARED FUTURE

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file from the Wikimedia Commons

We, European citizens, understand that Covid-19 is a common threat, that may hurt one country sooner than another, but will eventually hurt us all, and can impact our daily life and economy almost like a war.

We, European citizens, are worried and scared by this threat; and even more by the cacophony, selfishness and self-destructive short-sightedness of the different, uncoordinated national responses; by the lack of foresight of our national leaders, who pretend not to know that our interdependence requires a single European answer with strict containment measures of the pandemics, and an EU-wide plan to re-start the European economy afterward.

We, European citizens, denounce the current EU as an incomplete Res Publica, thus ill-equipped to face this challenge, with little competences and powers to face the pandemics. We welcome the timely decision by the Commission to provide 25 billion euro and financial flexibility to cope with this threat. Maybe it is the most it can do, but it is not enough.

We call upon the European Commission and Parliament to propose, and on the national governments to adopt (starting with the Eurogroup meeting of March 16, and a following extraordinary European Council to be called soon after) the following urgent measures, also using the Lisbon Treaty passerelle clause and simplified Treaty revision provisions:

  1. Make public health and the fight against epidemics a shared competence of the EU, subject to the ordinary legislative procedure, and provide the Commission with extraordinary powers to coordinate the response to the epidemics, as a federal government should do.
  2. Enlarge the scope of the European Stability Mechanism to finance the immediate strengthening of the European and national health systems to cope with the pandemics, which threatens the lives of European citizens, and thus also the economic and financial stability of the EU.
  3. Abolish the compulsory balanced budget provision for the EU and create an EU Safe Asset to be issued to finance an EU-wide plan to promote EU economic recovery and social cohesion during and after the emergency.
  4. Move fiscal issues to the ordinary legislative procedure and provide the EU with fiscal powers to adopt new own resources – such as the carbon tax (and carbon tariffs), the digital tax, the financial transaction tax – to finance the EU budget (or the Euro-area Budgetary Instrument, if the decision could be reached only at the Euro-area level).
  5. Immediately approve the next Multiannual Financial Framework increasing the budget to at least 1,3% of the EU GDP, as requested by the European Parliament, on the basis of the current structure of the budget financing; and with the provision to reach 2% with the new own resources, to ensure the provision of crucial EU-wide public goods.
  6. Turn the planned Conference on the future of Europe into a fully-fledged European Convention to draft a new Constitutional Pact among the EU citizens and Member states.

We European citizens believe this is the defining hour for the EU. The social perception of the EU will be shaped for years by its response to this crisis. This is the time to prove the EU is a community of values with a shared destiny, a life-line for its citizens and member states in the face of a turbulent global world with political, economic and health threats. It is time for bold common steps to overcome fear. It is time for European unity, not for national division.

 

To sign follow this link

Below a first list of signatories (now more than 400)

Romano Prodi, Former President of the European Commission, former Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, President Sciences Po; President Jacques Delors Institute; former Italian Prime Minister Enrique Baron Crespo, Chair Jean Monnet ad personam, Former President European Parliament Pascal Lamy, Honorary President Jacques Delors Institute; former European Commissioner; former Director-General World Trade Organization Anna Diamantopoulou, President To Diktio, former Greek Minister and European Commissioner José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, former Prime Minister in Spain Ferdinando Nelli Feroci, President Istituto Affari Internazionali, former European Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship Gian Paolo Accardo, Founder of VoxEurope Alberto Alemanno, École des Hautes Études Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Founder and Director, the Good Lobby Daniele Archibugi, Acting Director, IRPPS – Italian National Research Council Brando Benifei, Member of the European Parliament, Head of the Italian delegation in the Socialist and Democrat Group, Board of the Spinelli Group Vítor Bento, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Políticas Universidade de Lisboa; former Director of the Foreign Department of the Portuguese Central Bank; former General Director of Treasury, President of Junta de Crédito Público and member of the European Monetary Committe Stefano Boeri, President Triennale di Milano; Full professor Urbanistica Politecnico di Milano Pierre Brunet, Directeur du Département des Masters de Droit public de l’Ecole de droit de la Sorbonne Maria Chiara Carrozza, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna di Pisa, former Rector, former Italian Minister of Education, University and Research Innocenzo Cipolletta, President Assonime, former director general of Confindustria (Association of Italian Business) Carlos Closa, European University Institute, former Director of the European, Transnational and Global Governance research area; former Deputy Director at the Centre for Political and Constitutional Studies (CEPC) in Madrid, and member of the Venice Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe Stefan Collignon, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna di Pisa; former Harvard and London School of Economics; former Director Association for the Monetary Union of Europe Andrew Duff, President of the Spinelli Group; Visiting Fellow, European Policy Centre; former Member of the European Parliament Rafał Dymek, President Polska Fundacja Robert Schuman Sergio Fabbrini, Director School of Government at Luiss University Piero Fassino, President Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale; Vice President Foreign Affairs Committe of the Chamber of Deputies in Italy; Elsa Fornero, University of Turin, Scientific Coordinator of CeRP – Collegio Carlo Alberto, Vice President of SHARE and Research Fellow of IZA and Netspar, Former Italian Minister of Labour and Social Policies John Erik Fossum, Arena Center for European Studies, Oslo Mahmoud Gebril, former Prime Minister of Lybia Sandro Gozi, Member of the European Parliament, President of the Union of European Federalists, former Under-secretary of state for European Policies Ulrike Guerot, Head of Department for European Policy and the Study of Democracy, Danube University Krems, Austria; Founder of the European Democracy Lab in Berlin István Hegedűs, Chairman Hungarian Europe Society Aldo Kaslowski, Chairman of Organik holding, former Vice-President of Tusiad (Association of Turkish Business) Guillaume Klossa, writer, founder of EuropaNova and Civico Europa, Sherpa to the reflection group on the future of Europe 2020-2030, former Director at the European Broadcasting Union Anna Krasteva, New Bulgarian University and CERMES, editor-in-chief of Journal Southeastern Europe Peter Jambrek, President of the New University, Slovenia Cristophe Leclerque, Founder of Euractiv Network, President of Euractiv Foundation Jo Leinen, Former MEP, former President of the Spinelli Group, the European Movement International, the Union of European Federalists Francesca Longo, President Società Italiana di Scienza Politica Paolo Magri, Director Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionali (ISPI) Sylwia Majkowska-Szulc, University of Gdańsk, Secretary of the Board of the Polish Association of European Law Fabio Masini, University of Rome 3, Co-director International Centre for European and Global Governance (CesUE), Fabienne Peraldi-Leneuf, Sorbonne Law School Director of the Franco-Italian double degree Co-Director of the M2 International Lawyer, Giovanni Moro, Chairman of Cittandinanza Attiva Kalypso Nicolaidis, Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford Claus Offe, Hertie School of Governance in Berlin Gianfranco Pasquino, University of Bologna, Johns Hopkins Bologna Center and Fellow of the Accademia dei Lincei Otto Pfersfmann, Directeur d’Etudes Ecoles des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales / Lier-FYT Paris Mikolaj Pietrzak, Dean of the Warsaw Bar Association of Advocates Gaetano Quagliarello, Luiss University, Senator Lia Quartapelle, Research Fellow at ISPI, Member of the Italian Chamber of Deputies Dimitrij Rupel, Nova univerza Ljubljana; former Foreign Minister of Slovenia (1990-1993, 2000-2008) Saskia Sassen, Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology at Columbia University and a Member of its Committee on Global Thought, which she chaired till 2015 Giuseppe Scognamiglio, Chairman East-West European Institute Richard Sennett, OBE FBA; Visiting Professor, The Senseable Cities Lab, MIT; Chair, Council on Urban Initiatives, United Nations Habitat; Chair, Theatrum Mundi, Ingrid Shikova, Head of Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence European Studies Department, Sofia University “St.Kliment Ohridski” Enzo Siviero, Rector eCampus University, Architect Christoph Strecker, Judge, Founder of MEDEL (Magistrats Européens pour la Démocratie et les Libertés) Allain Terrenoire, Président de l’Union Paneuropéenne Internationale Arnaud Thysen, Director European Business Summit Nathalie Tocci, Director Istituto Affari Internazionali, former Advisor to VP/HR Federica Mogherini Nadia Urbinati, Columbia University, Andrea Biondi Director Centre of European Law Dickson Poon School of Law Kings College London, Peter Schiffauer Deputy Director Dimitris-Tsatsos-Institut for European
Constitutional Sciences Fernuniversität in Hagen, Livio Vanghetti, Executive Vice President of Philip Morris Anna Wessely, ELTE University of Budapest, President of the Hungarian Sociological Association, Editor-in-chief of BUKSZ – The Budapest Review of Books Vladimiro Zagrebelski, Carlo Alberto College in Turin, former Judge of the European Court of Human Rights Bénédicte Zimmermann, Directrice d’études at the EHESS Paris, Susanna Cafaro Università del Salento, Vice-President of the Italian Society of International Law, Fabienne Péraldi Leneuf Ecole de droit de la Sorbonne, Nico A. Heller Democracy School, Paolo Garonna Università LUISS G. Carli, Elisa Baroncini Università di Bologna, Pietro Gargiulo Università di Teramo,  Gianpaolo Maria Ruotolo Università di Foggia, Luigi Daniele Coordinatore del Dottorato di ricerca
in diritto pubblico Università Roma “Tor Vergata”, Annamaria Viterbo, Università di Torino, Vesselin Popovski Professor Vice Dean Jindal Global Law School Haryana, India.

 

Lights and Shadows in European Democracy: the Appointment of the European Commission

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In the picture: the new President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, the first woman to be appointed in this position.

The first task of the newly elected European Parliament is the election of the new President of the Commission, and, in a second stage, the full list of Commissioners agreed with the Commission President-elect. The Executive Body of the Union, so, is a direct expression of the political majority inside the Parliament, it matches the same term of office of EP members (5 years) and can be dismissed at any moment by the same Parliament.

What I just described is the well known parliamentary model for governance.

Plus…

…in the European Union, there is some plus as well as some minus…. confirming its hybrid and experimental formula for governance. There are some shortcomings if we look at it in comparison to the state model and  – yet – some improvements and positive innovations which come from being an advanced experiment in open governance, at least when some institutions are concerned.

For instance, few national institutions are so much online as the European Parliament, whose work (agenda, preparatory documents, committees’ activity, and plenary debates) are fully accessible. Few governments are so much scrutinized by their parliaments before the appointment. And if you have doubts about it, just follow online the hearings of the commissioners to be – in the competent Parliament’s committees – from September 30 to October 8. I can tell you that some of them could not pass the examination: a negative evaluation has prompted candidates in the past to withdraw from the process.

I wish I saw this in my home countries where governments come and go and usually some ministers are not qualified for the task…. but that is considered dramatically normal as political belonging wins over skills and performance.

But…let’s have a look at the shadows.

First of all, the two supranational bodies – a Parliament directly legitimized by European citizens and an independent Commission legitimized by the Parliament (just like many national governments) – have to co-exist and share their role with two intergovernmental bodies, whose role, even if balanced and circumscribed, is still powerful. These institutions are the Council and the European Council, directly representing, through their ministers and heads of government, the member states.

Even if a chamber representing the interests of states is a normal component in the federal systems and each member of the two bodies receives legitimacy from its own national democracy (being them governments’ representatives… that’s why it is so important for all that each member state remains a democracy), the composition of the two changes at any national election (or national change of government) and their  continuity and coherence, as well as the transparency,  aren’t exactly ideal.

The European Council, i.e. the heads of Member states, nominate a candidate for the post of Commission’s President, taking into account the European election results. Of course, they are willing to pick somebody who could win the confidence of the Parliament, yet the Treaty does not oblige them to indicate the same person chosen by the political groups as their candidate, as it happened with Juncker five years ago (spitzenkandidat). Unfortunately.

The Parliament needs to approve the new Commission President by an absolute majority (half of the existing MEPs plus one). Otherwise, the European Council needs to propose another candidate within a month’s time, acting by a qualified majority. 

On 16 July 2019, the European Parliament elected Ursula von der Leyen the future President of the European Commission. She is the first woman to be President-elect of the European Commission. She is also the first President representing a coalition (S&D, Green, Liberal). Moreover, she is the first President committed to enshrining gender equality.

The Council, in agreement with the Commission President-elect, adopts a list of candidate commissioners, one for each member state.  Even if they do not represent member states, in order to pursue the common interest of the Union and to respond only to the European Parliament, the role of national governments remains fundamental in designating them.

After the Commissioner-designate appears before parliamentary committees in their prospective fields of responsibility and each of them draws up its evaluation of the candidate’s expertise and performance, the full Commission, including the President and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, needs to be approved in a single vote by the Parliament.

After the President and Commissioners have been approved by Parliament, they are formally appointed by the Council, acting by a qualified majority. In the event of a substantial portfolio change during the Commission’s term of office, the filling of a vacancy or the appointment of a new Commissioner following the accession of a new member state, the Commissioners concerned is heard again before the relevant committees of the Parliament.

Is this procedure democratic? I would say so. Is the Commission legitimized as the Executive of the Union? Once again, I would say so.

Of course, it would be more if national governments opened up their own procedure (if any) to appoint candidates. Or if the Council became a more stable Chamber of States.

Are European citizens aware of these mechanisms? No, they are not. I doubt even the majority of national politicians and of journalists are, really.

Until the largest part of the population will still miss some important pieces of the puzzle, misperception will undermine the good functioning of European democracy as democratic links need to be felt and lived with. Awareness is the main ingredient missing in the European recipe… and of course yes, any recipe can be improved!

Before the European Elections, Let’s Talk about Us, the Citizens

A new event hosted by Università del Salento on April 5, 2019, Rectorate (Piazzetta Tancredi), open to the public:

 

CITIZENSHIP IN ACTION: IMPLEMENTING PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Ten years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union is a democratic space, as its founding treaties officially recognize (art.10-11) TEU. Yet, many citizens don’t know their European civic rights and the potential of the Treaty of Lisbon – to enhance the role of the citizen at the center of the system – appears underexploited.

Which tools and channels can citizens activate to get involved in the European decisional process?

Could transparency in the EU legislative process be enhanced?

Is citizens’ legal protection guaranteed in any stage, as individuals and as members of communities and groups?

Are the core values of the Union guaranteed as well?

Can we really say that there is “no way back” on democratic guarantees?

 

These topics will be discussed with the audience by:

 

 

Onno Brower ( Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer Law Firm – Amsterdam/Brussels)

Antonio Caiola (European Parliament Legal Service – Luxembourg)

Emilio De Capitani (European Parliament, King’s College- Brussels)

Claudia Morini (Università del Salento)

 

Chair: Susanna Cafaro (Università del Salento)

 

 

 A summary will be posted shortly after!

 

 

Scientific Coordination: Susanna Cafaro, Emilio De Capitani

WHICH INSTITUTIONS FOR RIGOR, WHICH INSTITUTIONS FOR GROWTH?

 

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Demonstrators march to protest against the British government’s spending cuts and austerity measures in London on June 20, 2015. (Agence France-Presse)

The role of rigor (and austerity) as a way to correct fiscal imbalances in the midst of the economic crisis, has been extensively debated over the last few years, and it is still a contentious issue to this date. The recipes imposed by the Eurozone authorities and by the IMF in the European sovereign debt crises have been widely criticized and contested. In one specific case, they have even been recognized as wrong. Well-known economists Carmen Reinhardt and  Kenneth Rogoff have been questioned in their main research finding of an existing inverse relationship between public debt levels and growth rates, beyond a certain critical threshold. On the other hand, there is a consensus that high levels of public debt are not desirable as they may pose a serious issue of sustainability and financial vulnerability. As a result, the need to keep the public budget under check is a broadly shared policy objective. A hotly debated issue, though, is whether the fiscal adjustment should be done during the crisis, at the risk of depressing growth, or whether it should be backloaded thus allowing the fiscal budget to support output and employment.

But, one fact is a logical antecedent to the debate itself: which institutions are supposed to be the best judges for choosing the optimal balance between rigor and growth?

A tentative way to start addressing this question is to assume a division of tasks between global agencies (like the IMF and G20), regional institutions (like the EU), and nation states. Each with its own set of competencies and responsibilities.

We then need to have some understanding of growth and rigor.

It’s hard to define growth. It is the result of a mixture of heterogeneous ingredients. Most of them are economic ones: the state may stimulate growth through public policies aimed at supporting investment and entrepreneurial initiatives. Similarly important are the institutional ingredients, such as the set of norms and rules aimed at encouraging certain economic behaviors or discouraging others, or the measures to make public administration more efficient or to reduce its costs. Other ingredients are social ones, such as public investment in health, education, and inclusiveness, which produce results in the long run. The whole mix of ingredients, moreover, has to communicate a sense of social justice and of shared efforts in order for it to be acceptable for the population.
Even though good practices may be of inspiration to countries engaging in pro-growth strategies, there is no such a thing as “the” right recipe for growth. Successful growth strategies differ from country to country, and across periods, and vary according to the strengths and weaknesses of each country, its culture, institutions, and level of technological development. The international context may influence domestic growth significantly.

It may be argued that growth has some kind of conceptual primacy inscribed in the mission of international institutions such as the IMF and World Bank, as well as of many regional organizations aimed at economic and financial cooperation. Of course, the way growth and other objectives are articulated in the charters of such institutions reflects, besides the different purpose and peculiarities of each, also the different times when their charters were written. Therefore, for instance, while the IMF Articles of Agreement (1944) show a conception of growth that is deliberately based on purely economic terms, the EU Treaty (1957 and revised many times) aims at a different, holistic, idea of growth, complemented by social elements, reflecting the cultures and politics of the region, as it has evolved over time.

Let’s explore now the meaning of rigor: it is understood to be a conduct (or even a set of rules) aimed at limiting excessive public debt and state deficit, and at restoring good governance and sound public finances. In practice, in the case of excessive deficits and/or debts due to cyclical or structural difficulties, rigor often translates into austerity policies, with cuts to public expenditures and high social costs.

Moving to the responsibilities and tools of international organizations, we do find many examples of interventions aimed at strengthening rigor rather than supporting growth. On the occasion of the recent European sovereign debt crisis, both IMF and EU engaged in supporting and restoring public finances in several countries. The Eurozone itself, in the process of strengthening its governance, added new instruments and regulations for disciplining public finances more effectively.

In the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) we find several rules of hard law that are intended for achieving more rigor, like, for instance, the articles 123-126 on fiscal discipline.

The best-known one is art. 126:

 “1. Member States shall avoid excessive government deficits. (…)”

There are, moreover, various legal acts specifying rules for rigor and the sanctions for violating them.

Frameworks for growth have also been contemplated at the global and European level, of which many G20 communiques and the Europe 2020 strategy are good examples. Yet they are all nothing more than good intentions, or soft laws at best. All the relevant policy instruments – and especially the budgets – are in the hands of national governments and parliaments.

We can draw the first conclusion: while international multilateral organizations have economic growth in their statutory mission, they are in fact best equipped for delivering rigor.

Why is this so? A simple but nonetheless convincing line of reasoning is that rigor is unpopular. And since the ultimate goal of politicians is generally to be elected
(or re-elected), policies for rigor tend to be avoided as much as possible by democratic governments (and, even more, by populist governments), unless they can be blamed on somebody else. On the other hand, nation states are best positioned and equipped to deal with growth policies, since it is at this level of government that one finds (i) democratic representation of citizens in order to have legitimate choices; and (ii) resources necessary for growth initiatives.

Thus, it is really not surprising that states have transferred the political price of unpopular (but necessary) measures for rigor to different levels of government, levels where there are no political elections. One of the consequences is that states are risking to kill international levels of government with unpopularity.

This dichotomy suggests a number of questions: (i) is nationally driven growth the best solution? Is it the best solution, if international organizations are responsible for imposing rigor?

The choice to place the tools for growth at the national level may appear in contradiction with the goals attributed to the IMF and the EU (as already mentioned), but also with the plans and guidelines for growth formulated periodically by the European Council and the Groups of States (G8, G20), which point to the need for making growth a commonly shared objective by the global community, one which requires international cooperative governance frameworks. At the same time, nation-states run against formidable obstacles to growth, as the international orientation to rigor inhibits their efforts to that end.

Back to growth: which are the main obstacles met by international organizations when they want to deal with growth? A first take involves responsibilities

If we believe that growth involves creative thinking and requires discretion, then we necessarily end up in the field of Politics (with capital P!), and leave the realm of technocracy.

This is substantially different than simply applying rules, which is what happens when international organizations intervene to enforce discipline.

Another obstacle is related to the budget. It’s not just a matter of having limited resources (even though, of course, larger budgets expand the set of feasible choices), but there is also an issue of “who” controls the budget. Only resources that are truly “owned” can guarantee independent (and creative) thinking.

Finally, there is an institutional issue. Growth requires a participative approach and a democratic institutional setup. A hard problem to be addressed is the coordination between the global and the national (as well as regional and local) levels of government. This is an area for multilevel governance and subsidiarity. Regional and global economic institutions may not impose growth recipes over populations but can offer useful fora for governments to discuss policy options and choices, which in the end only they can enforce.

In conclusion: if we consider rigor and growth from a purely “governance perspective”, we easily see that:

  • rigor is basically the application of rules;
  • it may be handled technocratically;
  • it has to be impartial (rules based);
  • it requires negligible budgetary resources;
  • it is easily and more conveniently delegated to supranational levels of government.

Growth, on the other hand, lays within the realm of political decisions. It implies a vision and requires making choices out of an infinite number of possible alternatives and combinations. The number of feasible choices grows with the increase of budgetary resources. Deciding on a growth strategy that is sustainable and inclusive demands democratic institutions.

 Rigor may, in fact, overrule growth preferences. The consequences are not merely economic, as they can have a significant impact on the democratic governance as well.

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AFTER THE CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED

foto (2)

My latest book is out and, yes, this is the title…. and, yes, there are some lessons we have learned, even if some of us wouldn’t have waited so long… they were clear enough since the beginning.

The Economic and Monetary Union was an unfinished project already in the Maastricht Treaty. This was the topic of my first book!

Anyway, now, the evidence is there for everybody, impossible to deny.

The simple, plain truth is that we have in the Eurozone a monetary union (or, better, it is a monetary union), but we have nowhere an economic union. Yes, we have a customs union, a common market, and some important side policies, as common regulations on consumers and environment protection (which is great), but we don’t have any European fiscal policy, just a coordination of national ones. And we have a European tiny budget not up to the task of any reallocation or redistribution of resources, almost no tax harmonization, no European welfare and even less hope to save a State risking default. Every financial intervention to rescue the states in crisis was an attempt to cope with this lack of competence and tools. Sometimes it worked, but, even then, it was too little too late.

In my new book, I try to describe – as clearly as possible – the Maastricht compromise: a monetary union without fiscal union, somehow replaced by a set of budget constraints intended to keep the budgets under control but, still, fully national. Then, I analyze the rules and regulations adopted after 2010 to face the crisis and the evolution of the role of the ECB. Finally, I explore the possible solutions: the reforms which would make the Union (or the Eurozone) a fiscal union. Some of them have been suggested by institutions, experts, and academicians, some are just my attempts to connect the dots…

This is the flyer of the book, available, for now, only in Italian

locandina libro

And this is the English translation of the TOC, I hope there will be soon an English edition:

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AFTER THE CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED

INTRODUCTION

The crisis of the law and the law of the crisis

Chapter I: THE UNFINISHED MONETARY UNION

  1. At the origins of the Maastricht agreements.
  2. The dichotomy of models for economic and monetary policies.
  3. The regulatory model of economic policy: reasons and limits:
  4. a) the coordination of economic policies;
  5. b) the code of conduct;
  6. c) the principle of “no bail out”.
  7. The institutional model of monetary policy:
  8. a) the reasons for monetary unification;
  9. b) the European Central Bank;
  10. c) independence and a strict mandate.

 

Chapter II: THE CRISIS AND THE EMERGENCY SOLUTIONS

  1. The global financial crisis and its European edition.
  2. The heterogeneity of policy instruments.
  3. The verticalization of politics and the intergovernmental management of the crisis.
  4. The impact on the democratic principles of the Union and of the Member States.

 

Chapter III: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE ECB

  1. The European Union is not an optimal currency area
  2. The ECB’s intervention in the crisis.
  3. The controversial legitimacy of its tools and the intervention of the EU Court of Justice.
  4. The role of a central bank: technocracy vs democracy

 

Chapter IV: THE MISSING TILE: THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE MONETARY UNION

  1. Europe’s role in global economic governance;
  2. The European Union and the euro area in the Bretton Woods institutions;
  3. The European participation in the groups of states;
  4. Who represents Europe?

Chapter V: REFORMS ON THE WAY, REFORMS NEEDED

  1. Two paths for reform: Rethinking the regulatory model of economic policy and making the Eurozone an optimal currency area;
  2. A Treasury and a Minister in charge for it;
  3. A European budget;
  4. Real own resources;
  5. Adjustment mechanisms for an optimal currency area:
  6. a) taxation;
  7. b) welfare;
  8. c) free movement of people

Chapter VI: THE DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE EURO AREA

  1. common and conflicting interests and goals;
  2. The unity of the institutional framework and its limits;
  3. How to stay together while respecting different views
  4. Possible scenarios after the Brexit

CONCLUSIONS

What if an economic union is also a good reason for a supranational democracy?

APPENDIX

A proposal: the European Agency for sustainable growth.

Manifesto: “A genuine European Union to ensure welfare, security, and democracy”

We European citizens are worried and scared. The economic and financial crisis has impoverished many of us. Youth unemployment risks creating a lost generation. Inequality grows and social cohesion is in peril. The EU is surrounded by war and instability from Ukraine to Turkey, the Middle East and North Africa. The flux of refugees and migrants has become a structural feature we must address together, in a human and forward-looking manner. In many Member states we witness authoritarian tendencies and the rise of nationalist and xenophobic forces. Democracy and the core values of the European modern civilization are under attack. The EU itself is questioned, although it ensured peace, democracy and welfare for decades.

We European citizens don’t want our national politicians to care only about their next local or national election. They ask for European solutions to European problems but then they act to render those solutions impossible or ineffective. They disregard sensible Commission proposals or fail to implement decisions already taken , including when agreed by all. They claim, one day, for Europe to do something and protest, the following day, Europe’s proposed actions. We ask national politicians and the media to stop depicting integration as a zero-sum game, thus pitting nations against one another. In an interdependent world no nation can satisfy all of its citizens’ basic needs and appeals for social justice. In this context, integration and supranational government is a positive-sum game. Our European social model based on liberal democracy and a social market economy can only survive in a multi-level framework of government, on the basis of the subsidiarity principle.

We European citizens are aware that globalization is transforming the world. We need a European government to foster our common values and contribute to the solution of the global problems threatening humanity. The world needs an outward-looking cosmopolitan Europe to help build a more effective and democratic global governance to cope with climate change, peace, global poverty, and the transition to an environmentally and socially sustainable economy.

We European citizens recognise the EU as an incomplete Res Publica. It has a ridiculous budget (0,9% of GDP) and no financial autonomy from Member states, while its current competences are out of date for what is necessary to successfully answer the challenges of the current crises. It has a federal like legislative, judiciary and central bank. But democracy is the possibility for citizens to choose the government and make it accountable. For the Union to work and be democratic its decisions, including budget, foreign and defence policy, and the reform of the Treaties, should primarily be taken by a qualified majority representing the majority will of European citizens and states. The Commission should evolve into a fully-fledged government, setting and promoting a political agenda legitimated through elections. European parties should present their candidates to the Presidency at the European election. The alternative is a directly elected President of the EU merging the Presidencies of the Commission and the European Council.

On 14 February 1984 the European Parliament adopted the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, the so-called Spinelli Project, pointing towards a political union, which Member states disregarded. On 14 February 2017 we call upon the European Parliament, the only directly elected body of the EU, to take a new initiative to kick-start the EU on strengthened democratic basis. Talking about banking, fiscal, economic, energy, security, defence and political unions makes sense only within a genuine democratic European Union, with all those policies under a European government.

On 25 March 2017 the Heads of state and government will celebrate the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1957. We call upon them to match the vision of the Founders. They should open the way to the re-foundation of the EU on the basis of the European Parliament proposal, and immediately exploit all the Lisbon Treaties’ instruments to strengthen EU institutions and policies, especially on foreign and security, economic and social policies. We call upon the Europe’s youth, its civil society, workers, entrepreneurs, academia, local governments and European citizens to participate in the March for Europe in Rome on March 25. Together we shall give the political leaders the strength and courage to push forward the EU to a new beginning. European unity is key to solve our common problems, safeguard our values and ensure our welfare, security and democracy.

If you agree, please consider adding your signature to the ones by over 300 European intellectuals and academics. You can easily do it here.

You can also join us in Rome on March 25, the programme is here.

SUPRANATIONALITY IN PRACTICE: THE EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP

The European Union’s founding Treaty (TEU) recalls and reaffirms the role of citizens in articles 9, 10 and 11 – provisions dedicated to its “democratic principles” – with the intent to establish a direct link between EU citizenship and democracy in the Union.

european-peopleThis need to look for (and find) legitimacy in citizenship – the dual legitimacy of the Union and of its member states – deserves to be analyzed as it is a peculiar expression of this supranational system. Although we find its most effective expression in the last edition of the EU Treaty, this quest for legitimacy is not new in the European integration process.

This is even more interesting as we consider that the lack of citizens’ ownership is often considered a cardinal sin in the process of European integration, whose elitist nature is often blamed.

We may find, instead, that citizens – as beneficiaries of rights as well as actors in democratic processes have always been important.

We can read in the article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Union that:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

Even if the significance of the word “democracy” remains unspecified, we could give a first and provisional definition referring to the values listed in art.2 itself, to the constitutional principles common to the member states and to the content of the European Charter of fundamental rights.

In terms of political participation, the European notion of democracy gained significance through the direct election of the European Parliament since 1979. Then, with the creation of a European citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and, eventually, thanks to the inclusion in the latest version of the Treaty of a title entitled to the Union’s democratic principles: the art. 9-11.

“Article 9

In all its activities, the Union shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.

Article 10

  1. The functioning of the Union shall be founded on representative democracy.
  2. Citizens are directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. Member States are represented in the European Council by their Heads of State or Government and in the Council by their governments, themselves democratically accountable either to their national Parliaments, or to their citizens.
  3. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.
  4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.

Article 11

  1. The institutions shall, by appropriate means, give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action.

  2. The institutions shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil society.

  3. The European Commission shall carry out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the Union’s actions are coherent and transparent.

  4. Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties. (…)”

This trail was actually prepared by the ECJ case law.  The  starting point was the Van Gend en Loos case (1963). In it the European Courts defines – for the first time – the Community as “a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields and the subjects of which comprise not only member states but also their nationals”. The Court quoted itself, using the same statement in other famous decisions such as Costa vs. ENEL (case 6/64), Simmenthal (case 106/77), Francovich (cases C-6/90 and C-9/90), opinions 1/91 (December 14th 1991) and 1/2009 (March 8th 2011).

After this first step came, one year later, the Costa vs ENEL case, where we read that “the member states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves”. In this case the Court clarifies two cardinal principles – the direct application and the prevalence of European law over national law – both are grounded on this direct relation between the European legal order and the citizens which are direct beneficiaries of its norms

This direct relationship between the citizens and the supranational organization is not immediately qualified as a supranational citizenship – which will appear only in 1992 – and it never became a “supranational nationality”.

Since 1992, in fact, the European citizenship is nothing but a set of additional rights, a status added to national citizenships, barely visible if not in the passport format. Keystone of this status is the principle of non-discrimination, walkway between many European peoples and a common citizenship.

Splitting the two concepts of citizenship and nationality – the first existing at two different levels (national and European) the second limited to the national level –  is therefore a basic element of a clear political project.

The strictly legal content of the European citizenship is indisputable, comparable to that which characterized the notion of the Roman civitas.

The abstractness of a citizenship that is pure legal concept becomes a strong choice where it appears to be an alternative to the notion of nationality or people, terms which instead bring with them a rich substratum of history, culture, religion, language, identity and belonging.

And, in fact, the Union’s objective is not to eliminate the nationality or  the peoples of the member states. Article 1 TEU refers to an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”, article 3 specifies that the Union’s aim is promoting “peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples“, the same provision recalls the richness of its cultural and linguistic diversity.

So, we have a clear separation between the two notions: a European politeia/citizenship and national demos/people, the first including a number of different national demoi living together in peace, under a roof of common values, principles and rules.

The same distinction is very clear in the preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, where we read:

“Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.”

And

“The Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States”. (Emphasis added)

Therefore, this European integration as a legal process – which coexists with strong national identities – is not necessarily a weakness of the system or the mark of an unfinished process, but it seems rather a choice.

Among the European countries there are strong elements of cultural commonality, especially when viewed in perspective, in the context of a globalized world. Europe’s common “spiritual and moral heritage” is not a rhetoric invention, but it was a clear choice to ground its legal order on a “citizenship without a people.”

This choice has some advantages: first, it does not conflict with the national identity recalled and guaranteed by the Treaty and it promotes an integration model based on the coexistence of diversities; second, it should respond better to the need to reassure the defenders of national sovereignty, reducing the risks of nationalist reactions or to the fear -even irrational- of losing national identities (even if, as Brexit is there to prove, it wasn’t enough). Finally, it prevents a possible European nationalism, a typical degenerative disease of nationality.

As we can see, it is a quite different model from the American melting pot.

This belonging to a polity, expressed in purely legal terms, is the real novelty of the European model, replicable in other geographical areas or global organizations – which could generate – one day – their one partial citizenships – and it opens the door to multiple and cumulative citizenships, not conflicting among each other, to communities partially overlapping.

Alongside this European polity – that performs the dual function of building an area of justice and rights and to legitimize the EU supranational institutions, there is another peculiarity of the European democracy: the absence of an explicit reference to collective self-government.

“Sovereignty belongs to the people” is a recurring formula in the states’ constitution and funding acts, so…how can possibly exist a democracy without a people? This requisite appears to be an essential and indispensable element of democracy – as also pointed out by the General Assembly of the United Nations (resolution no. 55/96 of 4 December 2000).

And here we see why this reference to the peoples of the Member States – alongside with national democracy – is also important: it becomes an implicit reference to national constitutions that recognize and codify these collective sovereignties.

The European polity thus integrates a second democratic level on top of the national one, the two being mutually invigorating. It’s no accident that democracy is an essential requirement for the accession to the Union (art.49TUE).

And yet, some people and some political figures still blame the Union for the persistence of a democratic deficit. We believe that this deficit is not in the EU institutional system but in some essential transmission belts required for a genuine democracy: European parties, a European political debate and – even more – a press reporting to citizens what happens in the European Parliament and the other bodies at work over the national level.

Another real gap is in the absence of awareness of many European citizens about their rights and their status in Europe, even if, once the mentioned tools in place, that would be maybe filled up.

So far, in vain  the European Commission launched communication campaigns designed to fill these gaps. The system is formally democratic, but essentially perceived as distant from its citizens.

Its democratic formula – being so disconnected from a sense of identity and belonging – is especially difficult to communicate. Even more difficult if press and political elites don’t give it a try.

“EUROPEANS FOR EUROPE”. RECOVERY IN THE AGE OF INTERDEPENDENCE

Europe is going through multiple crises: an economic crisis, a political and institutional crisis, a confidence and trust crisis. They are mutually reinforcing themselves.

The difficulty to face both the migrant crisis and the inner economic crisis fostered narratives grounded on nationalism: the apology of good old times or the ” we can do better by ourselves ” encouraged debates à la Brexit in several countries, moreover some political parties didn’t resist the temptation to blame foreigners or Europe for events which are really outside national and European control or which involve in various degrees the responsibility of local, national and European politics. The raise of anti-European parties, the walls under construction between countries and the step back on the Schengen commitments are all symptoms of a deeper problem.

The main road to restore confidence in the European institutions is a bold reform of the European treaties, improving the democratic side of the economic and monetary union through an increased involvement of the European Parliament and the establishment of a fiscal union.

The Eurozone still needs many elements which would make it a real optimal currency area, such as a bigger budget, real own resources (as some common taxes) and few elements of common welfare as would be an unemployment benefit. These would introduce automatic adjustments in case of crisis. Moreover, the discretion lost by national governments in the field of economic policy would finally be gained by the European level of government, which is now blocked by intergovernmental procedures and inadequate tools.

Unfortunately (i) all this requires time, as a new treaty needs a minimum of two years to be negotiated and ratified, even more to be implemented; (ii) all this postulates a strong and shared political will across Europe as treaty reforms require unanimous consent by member states. There is, vice-versa a need to act now, to restore the confidence in the Union and the credibility of the European integration project in order to prepare the ground for the so needed reforms. The best interventions are those able to answer to the immediate needs of the population and counter the narrative that Europe is damaging its own citizens. Only so, the raise of anti-European parties would be stopped.

What is needed is something similar to the Marshall plan for Europe, or to the New Deal for the United States: a big and bold recovery program.
What if money could be found almost for free, out of generosity, for a good cause?
For this reason I imagined a dedicated European Agency: the “Europeans for Europe Investment Fund”, for crowdfunding and investing on the basis of two basic assumptions:

  1. Citizens are willing to contribute to Europe’s Recovery ;
  2. European States are heavily indebted and the European budget is just too small for an ambitious investment plan, BUT private assets and savings are definitely relevant in Europe, making it (still!) one of the richest regions in the world

The “Europeans for Europe” recovery plan is not just intended to foster economic growth, but to address the multiple crises affecting Europe. Together with a financial crisis we are living a confidence crisis in Europe together with an identity crisis and a leadership crisis. There is a urge to bring back citizens to the public sphere, to make them feel fully involved in the choices, to counter the lowering level of participation to the electoral consultations, to give them pride in being Europeans, pride for what they have accomplished in the past, for their heritage of values and most of all for what they still can do for themselves and for the world.

The proposed plan is not intended to replace the necessary institutional reforms in Europe. Conversely, the necessary debates and negotiations have to start right now. It has nonetheless the aim to act in parallel and to prepare the ground for the political and popular approval of them, restoring a climate of confidence together with economic growth.

My project was submitted to the MGI Essay Prize: “Crowdsourcing ideas for revitalizing growth in Europe” as well as other 400 others. Unfortunately it was not among the three winners. Nonetheless, it was shortlisted among the 20 most innovative ideas submitted, as you can read in a booklet free to download on the prize page.

The full text of my paper is available on Academia. Feel free to comment, share and have a say!