In Defence of International Law

We will remember President Trump’s first speech – content, tone, setting, attendants – as a watershed in global history. For good or for bad, some moments are.

For us Europeans, it was a watershed in foreign and security policy and trade policy, but that’s the least of it. For each of us – on a more personal level – it was the end of a certainty dating back to WWII, the feeling of having the US backing us.

I don’t use these words lightly. As a Western European grown up during the Cold War, I was grateful for being a citizen in an (almost) democratic state, backed by an (almost ) democratic superpower. As a law professor and critical thinker, I don’t speak by absolutes.

Yet, as a teenager, I knew I could move freely in my half of the globe, access many different sources of information, express my dissent, and choose my path. These are not freedoms I take for granted, not anymore. Not when I see so many democratic recessions around.

President Trump was entirely within his rights when he declared that he would step back from the war in Ukraine and stop supporting that country. There was nothing wrong in stating a wish to promote peace. Yet, choosing to ignore that one is the aggressor and the other is the aggressed is a choice of field. Bullying the latter is a choice of field. Impartiality and love for peace have nothing to do with these choices.

He was far less in his rights when he expressed on several occasions territorial claims – to be enforced by force or by money – or the wish, immediately acknowledged, to rename the Gulf of Mexico. The American Gulf Stream is just a step away.

He was clearly outside any right or rule when he had the creative idea of imposing sanctions on the International Criminal Court (yes, it could not be more official). He manifested his support to the victim of the prosecution of the ICC, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, with a gift of 4 billion in weapons, while the said Prime Minister is responsible for a humanitarian catastrophe of epic proportions. Another peace-loving gesture.

A red thread connects all these positions, and other ones, such as threatening and negotiating a considerable rise in customs duties outside the World Trade Organization or withdrawing from multilateral organizations.

The attack is not on (or not just) Canada, Mexico, Greenland or the ICC; it is on the world order and international law as we know it.

The most sacred and precious rules of international law are the respect of borders and the prohibition of using force, also known as the principle of non-aggression. Both are written in the United Nations Charter and considered customary rules of international law, so necessary that they constitute its core of jus cogens.

Accepting the fact that Russia may well invade Ukraine and claim a part of it as a result, that Israel may annihilate the population of the Gaza Strip with bombs and starvation, that a state may appropriate another or buy another as it is convenient, means demolishing from the foundations every expectation of peace among any state in the world.

A 100 years step back in history.

Many people say that international law is ineffective, and many criticize the (often seen) double standards when some are sanctioned while others are not. Yet, no one has ever, until now, stated that a world without rules would be better. And many are at work daily to make the existing ones more effective.

A common criticism is that international law (just like any law) is for the weak, while the strong tend to ignore it. It is a precious truth. Law is for the vulnerable ones, for the minorities, and for the victim. It is the hope of justice, sometimes fulfilled, sometimes not. It is even more so in a community of not equals like the international community.

The European Union is an association of small and not-so-small states. Yet, none of them is big or big enough to navigate a world without law, and together, they are just 6% of the world’s population even if they produce the third GDP after (and close to) US and China. We are small, and we know it.

The Union has in its mandate the defence of international law. It is in article 21.1 of the Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU):

“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have
inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.”

If peace among its members is the structural goal of the Union, law – inside and outside of its territory – is its only hope for success. Our only hope. Our attempts at building a common defence policy are due and understandable, yet they will never be as successful as our rule of law.

When President Trump gave his inauguration speech, the big corporates’ CEOs and Silicon Valley gurus were with him. They are as powerful – and even more – and seem aligned on the same goal. Destroying international law seems to us a short-sighted and dystopian goal. The advantage of being free riders in a lawless world may bring benefits to the strong ones in the short term, but it is – cannot not be – an existential threat for all, even for them.

On a lighter note, I asked Chat GPT to produce a picture for “Defending International Law”, I was answered with a denial: “your request likely didn’t align with the content policy due to themes related to political and governmental symbolism in a way that could be interpreted as advocating for real-world organizations, movements, or ideologies.”

International law qualified as an ideology! Can you believe it?

I requested something within the content policy and got the esoteric fantasy picture you can see. The one above. Almost scary.

Do We Need an International Organization for Risk Management?

I had the pleasure, a couple of weeks ago, to discuss this topic with two distinguished colleagues: prof. Fabio Bassan (University Roma Tre, Italy), prof. Larry Catà Baker (Penn State University, US).

It was an occasion to reflect on a topic whose importance cannot be missed, as crises are more and more on the global agenda.

 

 

The unprecedented interconnectedness of states, populations, markets, is increasingly contributing to generate global crises. The risk of contagion of financial crises, of diseases, but also of social and political phenomena as terrorism – even the risk of spreading fake news threatening democracy – makes the world a global village. Issues which 50 years ago would have been national become now easily global. The International organizations were not created to manage the global village, but for the need to coordinate states i.e. compartmentalized national markets and national communities.  The current state of the world was unpredictable when most of the international organizations were created after World War II, so – not surprisingly – they are not equipped with proper competences and tools. They are built on rigid founding treaties which cannot be easily modified.

Some global issues, as rising temperatures, water scarcity, deforestation, generate more issues, as extreme weather events, migrations, conflicts, extreme poverty. Crises are often interrelated, multifactorial, cross-sectoral. The current pandemic crisis is also a major economic crisis and it is generating increasing inequality.

Yet, in international law, we see a fragmentation of roles and functions,  as most of the international organizations are sectoral, with a specific focus and field of interest (WFP, UNCCC, UNHCR etc…). Yet, there is a need to deal with the big picture as issues are often interconnected.

There are a few coordination fora, such as the G20 or the UN (and namely the Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee), yet the first lacks legitimacy being a group of self- selected states (just like all the Gs), the second lacks effectiveness, as it does not have legal tools for the enforcement of coordination.

Finally, there is an increasing demand for legitimacy and accountability. We assist in a multiplication of participation tools in the global public sphere – petitions, transnational political movements, structured dialogues of international organizations with civil society. Debates on the improvement of international organizations or the creation of a new international organization cannot avoid taking in these democratic expectations to some extent. The latter cannot be but multilateral as well as multi-stakeholders.

The solution proposed by prof. Fabio Bassan builds on a set of organizing premises. These include, first, that States consider systemic crises a challenge and an opportunity to be seized, in a ruthless competition not only between companies and markets but also between legal systems and between States, which in the dynamic of international relations now devoted to market power, have the effect of transforming the latter into political supremacy. Second, the fact that the marginal benefit thus acquired by one State entails a significant sacrifice for one or more other States and therefore entails a sub-optimal balance, constitutes a secondary but not irrelevant aspect. Given these premises, solutions ought to be guided by a principle of proportionality, among those that minimize the costs for the States in terms of transfer of sovereignty and reduction of competition between legal systems and between States in dealing with the crisis, but at the same time allow to coordinate the reaction to systemic crises.
In this context, IOs must be reconstituted to be able to perform coordination functions of
national actions in the immediacy of the crisis, in its management, and in overcoming the crisis.
In that reconstitution, IOs should be equipped with internal and operational rules suitable for managing and early warning functions and with a coherent power to direct and coordinate the actions of the States that are part of it. This organization should have legitimacy, at the highest level. The decisions would consist of coordinating the actions of national governments. The decisions should consist of identifying ways and forms of coordinated reaction to critical events.
These methods could integrate the use of existing economic institutions. And lastly, an
institutionalized form of connection and cooperation of this organization with the International Organizations responsible for economic, financial, health, climatic matters could also be envisaged, in order to acquire practices, protocols, information necessary for the adoption of decisions.

I entirely agree with the need to fill this gap in the current system of the international organization.

A valid alternative to a new organization is the revision of the existing system of IOs to increase legitimacy and accountability, to create (or upgrade) existing bodies equipping them with the necessary competences and tools, to provide them with data and practices already developed and spread in different organizations, to set transmission chains for information and coordination.

There is a long record of proposals to create a UN Economic Security Council. In this line, an interesting one has been put forward by J. Ocampo and J. Stiglitz:  the creation of the Global Economic Coordination Council (GECC). Even if this body, inside the UN institutional system would not be focused on crisis management, yet it would complement and complete the organization flanking the Security Council. It would meet at leaders’ level (Heads of States) and its representation would be based on the constituencies mechanism (a restricted yet elected body). The option for multilateralism is clear as well as for a more legitimate and representative system. The new body would be in charge of coordinating all branches of the UN that operate in the economic, social, and environmental fields, including the Bretton Woods institutions, so encompassing the ECOSOC competence. Even the WTO, would be brought into the UN system by appropriate agreements.

Another way to manage (economic) crises would be the upgrade of the  Ministerial Councils inside the Bretton Woods institutions– now just advisory bodies -to entrust them with a role of political guidance similar to the one currently played by the G20. The IMF has been created to deal with conjunctural crises and it could play a much bigger role in such occurrences, yet it can just manage national crises, not really systemic, transnational, and global ones. This is due, in our opinion, to its governance: a Board of Governors made up of 189 members representing governments of all member states (usually at ministerial level) and an Executive Board of  24, each representing a single country or groups of countries appointed for two years and full-time officials. So, the political body is just too big to make decisions (which are taken instead in G20, as previously in the G7), the body in charge for the administration lacks political legitimacy and the competence to take the most important decisions. The Ministerial Councils, instead, would represent not just themselves, but the whole membership of the organization through the constituencies’ mechanism. I have described this proposal in detail here.

In more general terms, the eminently technocratic management of many IOs has proved often inadequate, when it gets necessary to move to politically sensitive decision-making (hence the fortune of the Gs) so, the need for a political dimension in the global sphere appears evident. The two problems which need to be solved are the deficit of politics and the crisis of multilateralism (due also to its lack of effectiveness). Action can be taken on both fronts giving to a high-profile, adequately legitimized political body the competence to build strategies, inside a genuine, multilateral organization.

Multilateralism itself could be improved, as we see emerging actors such as the global civil society or companies having now a systemic impact on transnational public opinion and lifestyle, as the “Big Five” (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft). So, multilateralism could now evolve towards multi-stakeholders’ platforms, something we have already seen, for instance, in the internet governance, in some environmental bodies (as UNEA) or in the Committee on World Food Security. Nothing would prevent to give, right now, a small but significant role to civil society. For instance, it could play an advisory role, by commenting and contributing to the first drafts of policy and strategy documents of IOs posted online. No reforms are needed to spread such best practices already tested.

Coming back to the proposal by the colleague Fabio Bassan, it seems to respond to these needs as well as to fill a real gap, nowadays increasingly important, as the management of cross-sectoral crises. Of course, it fits in the European Solution as described in the video by professor Catà Baker – i.e. grounded on common institutions and shared values- and I suppose my comments and additions fit in the same box. It is maybe more than a cultural tribute, our European forma mentis.

I know both solutions are difficult to imagine in the current political agenda of many countries, and especially of some key actors, such as US, China, Russia, or Brasil. European Union, at the moment, is focused inward, on its own upgrade. Yet, as you know, it is not in the spirit of this blog to skip reasoning on something only because it looks unlikely at the moment. Let’s keep reasoning!