General

Why Europe is Losing its Credibility over the Greek Crisis

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

I will write now something quite subversive: the EU is a reasonably democratic entity.

It is the only international organisation to have a legislative power stemming directly from citizens, with its two-chambers system: the Parliament directly representative of its citizens and the Council, directly representative of governments which are too – at national level – directly representative of their citizens. Its powers are conferred by treaties duly ratified by member states’ parliaments or even through referendum. The legitimacy of EU acts is guaranteed by a judiciary system, composed by national courts and by European judges.

But, not surprisingly, the perceived level of democracy of the European system is now lower than ever.

There is a simple reason for that, which unfortunately is not explained and even less understood by media (and so, of course, by citizens): economic policy is NOT an European competence. And economic policy is what dominates the political debate nowadays.

The compromise agreed on in the Maastricht treaty – never changed since- is that monetary policy is an exclusive competence of the Union, while economic policy is a competence of the member states. Of course a single monetary policy cannot survive with 19 different economic policies. That’s why the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union provides for a coordination of national economic policies – now reinforced through the so called “European semester” and why there are a number of prohibitions aimed at avoiding excessive divergences among national economies (the so-called Stability Pact).

The coordination of national economic policies is a mere intergovernmental procedure, agreed among finance ministers and heads of state and government, without any judiciary control and – even less- democratic guarantees.

Why monetary policy was transferred to the European level, while economic policy remained national? Because budgets remained national.

The EU has a tiny budget (less than 1% of the EU GDP) which cannot allow any deep intervention in the management of crises or the fostering of growth. So, the EU can just recommend such measures to member states.

On top of that, states are not equal.

Not only they differ significantly in size and GDP, but they contribute differently to the EU budget (we have already written about that). And they contribute  differently to the interventions which are outside the EU legal framework, as mostly happened in the management of the Greek crisis.

One of the most dramatic consequences of this crisis – whose extent has yet to be measured – is that many European citizens believe that what happened in the management of the Greek crisis is the normal way of functioning of the EU.

It is not.

I can tell you that Europe is better that that and can do (has done) better than that. It has provided over the years a significant increase of the rights of citizens in many core areas such as consumers’ rights, environmental rights, safety of products, right to move, work, study or be healed in other EU countries and so on.

Pity that nobody explains that, nobody writes about it, nobody takes a stance for minimum democratic standards in the management of coordinated economic policies.

The price Europe is going to pay for the intergovernmental (poor) management of the Greek crisis is a loss of credibility in all the other fields of intervention. Trust will take long years to be (hopefully) restored.

I hope that our politicians and journalists are aware of that.

International Law vs Human Rights

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

International law sometimes is binding.

International treaties may be amended or repealed by new treaties, customary law can evolve over time (and sometimes it takes centuries), but a core of international law is really binding.

Members’ obligations under the UN Charter override their obligations under any other treaty; decisions by the International Court of Justice are law for the parties to the judgment; resolutions of the UN security Council – grounded on chapter seven of the charter- must be enforced and – of course –  rules of jus cogens are not modifiable.

What happens when this core of international law conflicts with fundamental rights of individuals? what comes first? Most of the legal scholars would say: the binding international rules. As uncomfortable as it appears, the primacy of the rules ensuring the peaceful coexistence of states must be guaranteed.

But aren’t human rights a too high price to pay? And isn’t the system contradicting itself? After all, the United Nations are the cradle of the doctrine of human rights: they gave birth to the  Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), another conerstone of international law.

Now, some jurisdictions are challenging the UN system on this same ground of the guarantee of human rights. A couple of meaningful examples will clarify what I’m saying: the Kadi saga and the decision 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court

Scholars of EU Law and of international Law are very familiar with the Kadi and Kadi II decisions which from 2001 to 2013 involved the European Courts in the evaluation of EU acts  implementing a UN Security Council binding Resolution.

In its Kadi judgment,  the European Court of Justice (ECJ) stated that “the Community judicature must (…) ensure the full review, of the lawfulness of all Community acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the general principles of Community law, including review of Community measures which, like the contested regulation, are designed to give effect to the resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”

The resolution we are speaking about ( Resolution 1267 (1999)) established a “Sanctions Committee” responsible in particular for designating the funds or other financial resources which all States must freeze in order to ensure that those funds or are not made available to, or for the benefit of, the Taliban . In Resolution 1333 (2000),  the UN Security Council instructed the Sanctions Committee to maintain an updated list of the individuals and entities designated as associated with Osama bin Laden, and held that States must freeze funds and other financial assets of these individuals. In order to implement this resolution, the Council of the EU adopted, inter alia, the contested Council Regulation 881/2002

Even if the ECJ emphasized that it had no  no power to review the lawfulness of resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, the European regulation adopted on its ground was annulled as the whole procedure both at UN level and EU level didn’t respect the right of the individual to be heard.

In the community of international lawyers this decision was almost heretical. infact, according to Article 103 of the UN Charter :

‘In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.’

But is the right of the individual to be heard just an European Law principle or is it a cornerstone in the whole human rights doctrine?

And even if one  may have little sympathy with that Saudi businessman (and his well equipped legal team), wasn’t the principle right?

In the so called Kadi II case, mr Kadi then brought new proceedings before the General Court, seeking annulment of Commission’s Regulation 1190/08.  It appeared that the delisting procedure available before the Sanctions Committee failed to offer the minimum guarantees of judicial protection, nor had the system set up at the EU level offered other than a formalistic protection. Even this second Regulation was annulled.

In October 2012 – after more than a decade-  Mr Kadi was delisted by the Sanctions Committee.

In July 18, 2013, the Court of Justice of the EU handed down the judgment in the so-called Kadi II dispute. With this decision, the Court dismissed the appeals brought by the Council, the Commission and the UK against the General Court’s judgment. In so doing, the Court has confirmed that Mr. Kadi’s inclusion in the list was in breach of his fundamental rights.

Now, we are not so much worried for the question whether the primacy of UN Charter obligations is jeopardized as -from a substantial point of view- we are for the non compliance with fundamental human rights by the Security Council

What is really important to point up is that since 2009 there is an  Ombudsperson in the UN System. It was established by Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009) and enhanced by Security Council Resolution 1989 (2011).  He is also in charge for assisting the Sanctions Committee in dealing with delisting requests.

The creation of the Ombudsperson is a direct result of combative individuals and brave judges (see also some cases in domestic courts, such as , Abdelrazik, Hay, Ahmed, etc). I don’t see it as a failure but as a step forward in international law.

Another step forward is suggested by the decision 238/2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court which concerned  the constitutional legitimacy of certain Italian norms which had been adopted by Italy in order to give application to the International Court of Justice’s 2012 Judgment on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy).

This time the clash was between the jurisdictional immunity of states and the rights of victims of war crimes and an “heretical” decision by the Italian Court chose to favor the rights of individuals.

In the dispositif, the Constitutional Court declared Article 3 of Italian law 5/2013 constitutionally unlawful. This article was a specific implementation of the ICJ Judgment of 2012, requiring Italian Courts to decline jurisdiction in any cases where the International Court of Justice had decided that Italian civil Courts should not adjudge upon the conduct of other States; moreover, the Court declared the 1957 Italian law of ratification of the UN Charter constitutionally unlawful,

“with respect to the execution given to Article 94 of the Charter, only to the extent in which it obliges Italian Courts to comply with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of 3 February 2012, which requires them to decline their jurisdiction in relation to the acts of a foreign State which consist in war crimes and crimes against humanity, impairing inviolable human rights”.
For further explanations of the Court’s reasoning, you can see here.
The conflict between fundamental human rights and international law cannot be healed remaining on the same level of thinking in which it has been generated, what I see here is an effort of the Italian Constitutional Court to move to a new level: giving fundamental rights a different stance vis-a-vis binding international law.

Democratizing the Bretton Woods Institutions

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

On the 15th of November 2008, in the midst of the global financial crisis, the leaders of the G-20 countries met in Washington DC. In the meeting’s final declaration, they committed to reforming the international economy governance – in order to steer their countries out of the crisis, boost economic growth and restore trust – by (among other things) overhauling the Bretton Woods institutions, i.e. the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The structure of the two institutions, created in 1944, had been discussed before, but never so firmly and by such a high-ranking forum.

In fact, the earliest reforms date back to the Seventies and were followed by regional financial crises that had global effects and sparked a debate among academics and politicians alike. New impetus came from the anti-globalization movements – particularly active during the Nineties – that put the Bretton Woods institutions on trial. The claims for more “voice and representation” by the developing countries,especially the emerging ones, whose economic success was fostered precisely by the contested globalization, came later on. These demands were echoed by major international conferences and groups such as the G24.

All this brought about a series of small actions through which the two organizations have begun to rethink their roles and structures.

Two subjects were on the agenda: how to make the Bretton Woods institutions (i) more effective, so that they can successfully face the challenges of development gaps (World Bank) and crisis prevention and management (IMF) and (ii) more democratic and less opaque, so that all their members and stakeholders can have a voice in and be represented, be they large or small, wealthy or not.

As a consequence of the 2008 global financial crisis, each of the Bretton Woods institutions convened groups of wisemen and committees of experts, and so did governments and other international institutions. The results of their work can be found in the Manuel Report; the Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System; the Zedillo Report. It’s also worthwhile to mention technical documents such as the FMI governance evaluation document by its Independent Evaluation Office and a series of reports from the civil society like  the 4th Pillar Report

All these debates had, as a consequence,  IMF  quota and governance reforms adopted on December 2010 and not yet in force because of the resistance by the main shareholder of the two organizations: the United States.

I have published – a couple of years ago- an e-book to examine the governance systems of IMF and World Bank and above all what I reckon is the core issue: their decision-making process. My analysis is based on the firm belief that the decision-making process affects the efficiency and also – indirectly – the outcome of the international organizations’ decisions. In other words, their governance systems are bound to influence and shape the results of the actions of the international organizations themselves.

Unfortunately – as the debates and the reforms stagnate – my book and my proposals are still up-to-date. Here they are, in a nutshell:

EIGHT SUGGESTIONS TO IMPROVE DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY
IN THE BRETTON WOODS ORGANIZATIONS

  1. Separate IMF and World Bank (autonomous memberships and attributions of shares, different quota formulas);
  2. Introduce a double majority (of states and votes) in the decisional bodies (Boards of Governors, Executive Boards and Ministerial Committees);
  3. Entrust Ministerial Committees with a role of political guidance similar to the one currently played by the G20, eventually foresee their possibility to meet (also) at head-of-state level;
  4. Rethink constituencies to reflect – when possible – regional integration and cooperation gatherings, as a first step towards multilevel governance;
  5. Give Executive Directors the only status of international officials and guaranteed independence while national interests will be reflected and balanced in Ministerial Committees;
  6. Give the Board of Governors the power to appoint and collectively dismiss the Executive Boards;
  7. Envisage membership of international organizations;
  8. Give civil society an advisory role, by publishing on the Internet the first drafts of policy and strategy documents and collecting comments and reactions. The final version of all documents should reflect in the motivation how and why decisions were made.

On all of these points I could speak for a long, if you are interested you can read it all in my book.

PS Good news: José Antonio Ocampo just released a paper about a reformed architecture for the international monetary system. The debate is officially re-opened!

Ecology of Social Systems

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

Some days ago I was speaking with my friend Sargon from the Bretton Woods Project and he came out with this idea of the ecology of the social systems. We liked it and tried to elaborate a bit.

Just like a natural environment a democratic social system has different subjects playing different roles. There are authorities, in charge for the realisation of one or more common goals (safety, education, health, acceptable living standards, sanitation, financial stability, and so on…). There are individuals, chosing or legitimizing in different ways such authorities. There are social bodies mediating among  the two sides: political parties, NGOs, trade unions, each of them with its specific role, duties, expectations. There are entrepreneurs and companies, producing goods, offering services, creating jobs.

All these form a kind of ecosystem, which should be in balance.

Similarly to what happens in a natural ecosystem, there are natural enemies (or better natural antagonists).  To same extent the conflict is physiological and even healthy: without it, imbalances would produce authoritarian systems, anarchy, or implosion, all kinds of decay.
The same happens in the global arena: international organizations interact with transnational civil society and -at times- suffer for violent critics and even demonstrations which may be healthy if aimed at improving human rights or correcting an authoritarian approach.

We could have the impression, at times, that it is nothing but a huge role-play, or we could claim that some cathegories of subjects are good and other bad. It would be a mistaken perspective. The real villains are those willing to kill the system -i.e. the balance- not those playing their part in it.

From Limited Sovereignty to Shared Sovereignty

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

“Sovereignty, though its meanings have varied across history, has a core meaning: supreme authority within a territory. It is a modern notion of political authority” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

It was only after the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, that -in Europe-  sovereign states appeared as we know them.

As we know them?

I am not really persuaded that I really know (or have known) “sovereign states”.

When I was a child, in the bipolar world, maybe just the United States and the Soviet Union were sovereign states. Maybe China too, in a different way.

The theory of limited sovereignty was spelled in clear words in the Eastern bloc, a bit less clearly (but it wasn’t less true), in the western one.

Since WWII, another kind of limitation of sovereignty came from international law, especially by International humanitarian law and human rights law. States were not completely sovereign anymore since they had obligations towards their enemies and towards their own citizens. The notion of domestic jurisdiction was gradually eroded.

In this sense, compressing national sovereignty was not necessarily bad, even if it came with lights and shadows: how many states signed human rights declarations only as a tool of propaganda? How many of them were willing to guarantee human rights and repress gross violations in other countries -using military force- even if standards at home were not so high?

The United Nations cannot really enforce what is officially declared or check the good faith of the states showing good will.

Eventually, the world became more and more interconnected and economically integrated: the so-called globalization. And new constraints on sovereignty were accepted – as WTO regulations – as a price to pay for the access to new markets.

Now, it is clear to me that sovereignty is nothing more than a fictional concept. The state is not anymore a supreme authority, a superiorem non recognoscens (if there ever was one).

It is a loss of sovereignty if we look at it from the state perspective. But we could try to see it from a different perspective.

From the global perspective – or the global public goods perspective – the loss of many fragmented sovereignties could be positive as far as they are replaced by some authority in charge for tackling the issues at stake and equipped to do it.

It is a shift from many not-really-sovereign entities to common authorities where sovereignty is fairly shared among the members.

Climate change offers a great example, but it isn’t the only one. The issue of nuclear nonproliferation is another one. What about financial instability?

From the global citizens’ perspective, the answer is not an allocation of power in whatever authority, but in the kind of authority they can interact with, and control. An authority provided with legitimacy and accountability, whose policies are inclusive.

The United Nations are not yet this kind of authority, nor the Bretton Woods institutions, but single projects and processes are leading the way. See, for instance, the World We Want platform.

Some regional organizations, as the European Union, paved the way (to some extent), but they can still improve.

Some atypical new international organizations opened innovative paths of supranational interaction among stakeholders: the Kimberley Process, the Internet Governance Forum, the Global Environmental Facility. They are an example of what I call democratic experimentalism.

The way from limited sovereignty to shared sovereignty is not a short or easy one, but what really matters is that it is not a loss, but a gain in sovereignty.

The 1 FOR SEVEN BILLION CAMPAIGN: UN LEADERSHIP MATTERS

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

Today, I host an important call. You can find it here

“The UN Secretary-General plays a crucial role in tackling global challenges and improving the lives of seven billion people. It is vital that the best person is chosen for the job. But the selection process is secretive and outdated. Just five countries hold sway over a decision that affects us all. The next Secretary-General will be appointed in 2016.

Individuals from across the world as well as organisations including Amnesty International, Avaaz, Forum Asia and more than 100 others are already on board. Eminent personalities like Kofi Annan and increasing numbers of governments support our aims. Candidates are putting themselves forward. Horse-trading is already underway. We need to act now.”

“Monday’s UN General Assembly debate saw a near universal demand for transforming the way in which the UN appoints its next Secretary-General.

32 member states and the EU spoke at the debate, voicing broad support for many of the concrete proposals made by the 1 for 7 Billion campaign.

Speaking at a press briefing, Natalie Samarasinghe, one of the United Nations Association – UK (UNA-UK); one of over 150 NGOs worldwide that belong to the 1 for 7 Billion movement, said:

“Not only did an unprecedented number of states speak, but their statements were stronger and – crucially – more detailed, setting out concrete, practical proposals to make the process more transparent and inclusive. We believe this spells the end of the outdated and opaque process that hasn’t been updated since 1946”.

The impact of the campaign was visible during the debate, with Liechtenstein, Mexico and Brazil making specific reference to it.

Nearly all states backed the need for a clear timeline and open exchanges with candidates. The majority (21 in total) called for female candidates to be seriously considered this time. No woman has ever held the UN’s top job.

Significantly, 10 states, including Brazil and Malaysia, called for an end to the “rubberstamping” function of the General Assembly, urging the Security Council to give the UN’s wider membership a real choice by putting forward more than one candidate.

Eight states, including Algeria, on behalf of the 120 member states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) supported consideration of a single, non-renewable term for the next SG.

The Council’s “backroom deals” with candidates also came under fire, with Algeria, on behalf of the NAM, India, Nicaragua, Brazil and Indonesia, calling for a merit-based appointment without pressure on candidates to make promises on other senior appointments.

Highlights of the debate included particularly strong statements made by the NAM, Costa Rica and India on the need for the Security Council to present more than one candidate. The Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) group, representing 27 states, laid down a practical guide for action, proposing a joint letter by the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council to open the selection process with a call for nominations and an end date.

In another welcome development, Canada reintroduced its important ‘non-paper’ on the selection of the Secretary-General, calling for substantive reform in the UN’s 70th anniversary year.

Vague statements made by the EU and Germany were particularly disappointing.
Predictably, only China, Russia, and the United States, three of the five Security Council members with the power to veto candidates, made statements in favor of the status quo. France remained vague. The UK displayed some leadership, proposing a clear ‘structure’ in the recruitment process, including a deadline for candidate declarations and a timetable for appointment. Matthew Rycroft, the UK’s new Permanent Representative to the UN, said:

“Yesterday’s debate is an excellent basis for negotiating a strong resolution, cementing an open and inclusive appointment process. The job of the SG is one of the most challenging and influential in the world, affecting the lives of seven billion people. We must now push hard to translate words into action in the tough negotiations that lie ahead.”

Ten reforms

A comprehensive reform of the selection process for future UN Secretaries-General should include all of the following:

  1. The position and qualifications should be advertised in all countries, with a call for nominations by Member States, parliaments and civil society organisations, and include a closing date for nominations.
  2. A formal list of selection criteria should be published by the UN; these criteria should stress that the best person should be chosen irrespective of his or her country of origin.
  3. A clear timetable for the selection process should be made public by the President of the General Assembly and President of the Security Council, no later than the start of the GA’s 70th session.
  4. A list of all the official candidates and their CVs should be published by the President of the GA at the end of the nomination phase and by the Security Council President when considering its list of preferred candidates.
  5. The President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council will be jointly responsible for regularly updating the UN membership and general public on the selection process once the full list of candidates has been announced.
  6. Each candidate should release a manifesto, which should include their policy priorities and a commitment to selecting senior UN officials on the basis of merit, irrespective of their country of origin.
  7. Once the names of all candidates have been announced, the General Assembly should organise a series of open sessions that will enable member states as well as the public and media to scrutinise candidates and their manifestos.
  8. The GA should insist that candidates do not make promises to individual countries on senior appointments, and member states should undertake not to seek such promises.
  9. The Security Council should be encouraged to present two or more candidates for the General Assembly to appoint as Secretary-General.
  10. The term of the Secretary-General should be limited to a single, non-renewable period of seven years.

Be a global citizen, join the campaign, select one of the proposed candidates or suggest your own, spread the word.

“Just” Utopia?

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

Utopia is a great place to go.

Literally, coming from ancient Greek (yes, this too) “u-topia” means non-place. So, in the common understanding, it means a non-existing place, somewhere where it would be absurd to go!

But what if you just added a little “yet”? A place non-existing “yet”? All changes!

All the great leaders headed to utopia, they depicted it in vivid colours, showed the way or -even better- opened the way.

They explained it clearly: this place doesn’t exist yet. That’s why we are going to create it. No tricks, the plain truth.

People bought their vision and made it possible.

I’m thinking of Mahatma Gandhi, of Martin Luther King, of Nelson Mandela.

They didn’t pretend to be realistic, they used words like “vision” or “dream” and they created what previously was just utopia. Because nothing would change or come to existence if it were not created in the imagination first.

I looked on the web for a map of Utopia. Surprisingly enough, I found many … and from different ages!

And I found this quote by Oscar Wilde:

“A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias.”

Speaking of “real” maps, I came across the beautiful “Map of Humanity” by James Turner.

mapofhumanity

On it, the island of Utopia lays just halfway between the continents of Wisdom and Reason in the Oceanus Procellarum.

I realized that he was making an interesting point here: to reach Utopia you have to cross the ocean of storms. Well, not exactly a stroll in the park!

So, the reward of reaching Utopia is for the brave ones, the determinate ones, the resilient ones. As Gandhi said, “First they ignore you, then they laugh at you, then they fight you, then you win.”

Well, we are not Gandhi…

The good news is: when the way is open, when the first man or woman reaches Utopia – be him a leader, an explorer, a scientist, a philosopher- Utopia is not Utopia anymore, it becomes a real place, open to all.

That’s why people on a trip to Utopia have all my respect: they are generous, they are opening a way for us all.

To know more about my personal journey to utopia…

The Debate Is Open!

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

We all know which global challenges and concerns the world faces today.

Unfortunately, the international community lacks of adequate tools to manage all this.

All those who think that global citizens – as we all are- should do something will find a place for discussion in a Linkedin Group named Supranational Democracy.

it is a space to reflect and discuss – frankly and openly- about what to do and where to start from.

I think that possible solutions for a democratic globalization have to be intercultural and interdisciplinary.
Among the topics that we could discuss there there are: global governance; protection of human rights and development of civil and political rights at supranational level; digital democracy; innovative and creative governance; role of civil society and ways to raise awareness about the global dimension … and this is maybe just the tip of the iceberg.

It’s an open group: feel free to join, to invite new members, to contribute to discussions and suggest new topics for discussion… or even to watch what’s going on without joining.

You are very welcome!

Susanna

Budget Matters!

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

A supranational democratic organization requires its own legitimacy as well as independence by its member states: they are represented and participate actively in the decisional chain, but cannot keep the decisional process hostage of their own will.

In order to be free, an international organization needs an adequate financial independence, i.e. its own budget. Without it, its decisions aren’t the result of a balance of values and interests at stake, but become mere negotiations among the most influential capitals and, ultimately, the result of a balance of power –  so undermining the added value of supranationality and multilateralism and reducing to zero the role of individuals. Real independence can be guaranteed only by specific statutory provisions and by an adequate budget.

But how a budget may be an independent one?

In 1970 a strong commitment for financial autonomy in the European Economic Community was mirrored by a genuine system of own resources – basically agricultural and import duties, complemented by a small quota of the harmonized value-added tax. National contributions (in a percentage of gross national incomes) were reintroduced in 1988 in order to complement a decrease in the own resource revenue, which became more and more relevant in the following decades as import duties decreased as an effect of evolving international trade rules.

As a consequence, what was supposed to be a transitional solution was reinforced over the years, reducing significantly the financial autonomy of the Union. It’s not surprising, now, that some States are more equal than others and speak with louder voice!

So, genuine own resources are a necessary complement to a democratic system and resources means – first of all-  taxes.

The ancient slogan “no taxation without representation” may so be easily reversed, as “no representation without taxation” because what could elected representatives do with money which is gracefully granted by the richer (if not pleasing them)?

The debate on which taxes could better fit a supranational system is open and not only in the European Union: carbon taxes, financial transactions taxes, e-commerce taxes? What makes some proposals interesting is that they could have useful side effects, such as reducing CO2 emissions, decreasing inequalities, limiting tax avoidance.

Another interesting path of reasoning is considering some resources which are revenues without being taxes. See for instance the possible income coming from the common heritage of mankind (and taxes on related activities), which could be employed for the benefit of humanity.

Some examples of the “common heritage principle” may be found in international law: in the Outer Space Treaty (1967), in the UNESCO World Heritage Convention (1972), in the never ratified Moon Treaty (1979), in the Montego Bay Convention establishing the Seabed International Authority (1982), in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.

Which better use could be made of the principle of the responsibility of the present generations towards the future ones than designating some mankind’s sources of revenue to finance the functioning of a democratic global system? 

Democratic Experimentation

Posted on by Susanna Cafaro

A possible paradigm for democracy in international organisation is what I call democratic experimentation.

The aim of it is reinforcing the typical elements of the democratic model – legitimacy, accountability, inclusiveness – inside IOs in the most effective ways, consistently with the specific institutional frame and goals of each organization.

In order to do so, the embryonic forms of legitimacy, accountability and inclusion – already existing in a number of IOs – may be progressively strengthened and may evolve into more effective tools and channels. They may be declined in original ways to be improved gradually.

Why “democratic experimentalism”? Because the need to invent new formulas to adjust to the different fields of action and to the different global public goods involved requires that we proceed empirically by trial and error.

A model in this approach is the European Union, defined as “a new legal order” by the European Court of Justice in the famous Van Gend en Loos decision (1963, Case 26/62). It is a model only in terms of process, i.e. in the ability to proceed by trial and error towards more mature forms of democracy, but not in terms of outcome, which is the product of specific historical, cultural and geographical circumstances.

In other words, each international organization could experience a “legal order formula” of its own for  legitimacy, accountability and inclusion, which would be the result of its own specific features and aims. In order to allow such evolution, it is necessary that statutes and founding treaties  establishing the IOs foresee a clear and accessible revision procedure and that they are not considered as carved in stone.

Cultural and structural differences among the organisations prevent from finding universal solutions. What is necessary is rather to find a method and agree on the values and objective to be pursued. As was the case with the process of European integration, other international organizations could evolve into sui generis  legal orders, never seen before.

The twofold advantage of this approach would be: (i) allowing us to read in a teleological frame a series of small evolutions taking place in the law of international organizations (the multiplication  of complaints mechanisms, monitoring bodies, dialogues with civil society); (ii) giving us a key to interpret and measure their progress.

There isn’t yet a ranking of international organisations according to their democratic standards (as there is for States). Nonetheless, it would be possible to build a set of criteria and data to make it possible.

I’m sure that this would be a valuable exercise… and I’d love to contribute.