THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AFTER THE CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED

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My latest book is out and, yes, this is the title…. and, yes, there are some lessons we have learned, even if some of us wouldn’t have waited so long… they were clear enough since the beginning.

The Economic and Monetary Union was an unfinished project already in the Maastricht Treaty. This was the topic of my first book!

Anyway, now, the evidence is there for everybody, impossible to deny.

The simple, plain truth is that we have in the Eurozone a monetary union (or, better, it is a monetary union), but we have nowhere an economic union. Yes, we have a customs union, a common market, and some important side policies, as common regulations on consumers and environment protection (which is great), but we don’t have any European fiscal policy, just a coordination of national ones. And we have a European tiny budget not up to the task of any reallocation or redistribution of resources, almost no tax harmonization, no European welfare and even less hope to save a State risking default. Every financial intervention to rescue the states in crisis was an attempt to cope with this lack of competence and tools. Sometimes it worked, but, even then, it was too little too late.

In my new book, I try to describe – as clearly as possible – the Maastricht compromise: a monetary union without fiscal union, somehow replaced by a set of budget constraints intended to keep the budgets under control but, still, fully national. Then, I analyze the rules and regulations adopted after 2010 to face the crisis and the evolution of the role of the ECB. Finally, I explore the possible solutions: the reforms which would make the Union (or the Eurozone) a fiscal union. Some of them have been suggested by institutions, experts, and academicians, some are just my attempts to connect the dots…

This is the flyer of the book, available, for now, only in Italian

locandina libro

And this is the English translation of the TOC, I hope there will be soon an English edition:

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AFTER THE CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED

INTRODUCTION

The crisis of the law and the law of the crisis

Chapter I: THE UNFINISHED MONETARY UNION

  1. At the origins of the Maastricht agreements.
  2. The dichotomy of models for economic and monetary policies.
  3. The regulatory model of economic policy: reasons and limits:
  4. a) the coordination of economic policies;
  5. b) the code of conduct;
  6. c) the principle of “no bail out”.
  7. The institutional model of monetary policy:
  8. a) the reasons for monetary unification;
  9. b) the European Central Bank;
  10. c) independence and a strict mandate.

 

Chapter II: THE CRISIS AND THE EMERGENCY SOLUTIONS

  1. The global financial crisis and its European edition.
  2. The heterogeneity of policy instruments.
  3. The verticalization of politics and the intergovernmental management of the crisis.
  4. The impact on the democratic principles of the Union and of the Member States.

 

Chapter III: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE ECB

  1. The European Union is not an optimal currency area
  2. The ECB’s intervention in the crisis.
  3. The controversial legitimacy of its tools and the intervention of the EU Court of Justice.
  4. The role of a central bank: technocracy vs democracy

 

Chapter IV: THE MISSING TILE: THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE MONETARY UNION

  1. Europe’s role in global economic governance;
  2. The European Union and the euro area in the Bretton Woods institutions;
  3. The European participation in the groups of states;
  4. Who represents Europe?

Chapter V: REFORMS ON THE WAY, REFORMS NEEDED

  1. Two paths for reform: Rethinking the regulatory model of economic policy and making the Eurozone an optimal currency area;
  2. A Treasury and a Minister in charge for it;
  3. A European budget;
  4. Real own resources;
  5. Adjustment mechanisms for an optimal currency area:
  6. a) taxation;
  7. b) welfare;
  8. c) free movement of people

Chapter VI: THE DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE EURO AREA

  1. common and conflicting interests and goals;
  2. The unity of the institutional framework and its limits;
  3. How to stay together while respecting different views
  4. Possible scenarios after the Brexit

CONCLUSIONS

What if an economic union is also a good reason for a supranational democracy?

APPENDIX

A proposal: the European Agency for sustainable growth.

Refugees as Global Actors

 

Image: UNHCR

Image: UNHCR

Some days ago I came across this beautiful petition (thanks Twitter!), which resonates with my assumption that individuals should have a say about issues and policies which impact on their life, even when they are managed at global level.

I copy/paste it here for you to read and possibly sign:

Internally displaced persons, refugees and people living in exile unite!

Europe is presently facing its biggest refugee crisis since the Second World War. Millions of people are being displaced in Syria and Iraq, as well as in other parts of the world, and many are trying to reach Europe, not only because they hope to be safe there, but also because of the political rights Europeans enjoy and take for granted: the right to free expression, the right to vote and so forth.

Yet, those few who do make it to Europe find themselves excluded from public life, without political rights and without a voice. To challenge that, we, people displaced by force, together with some NGOs and other stakeholders, are starting to organise ourselves with a view to creating new democratic structures both locally and internationally, so that in future internally displaced persons, refugees and people living in exile can offer themselves as dialogue partners to local councils, national parliaments, the European Parliament and the UN.

If you would like to support this initiative, please sign this petition now. We look forward to hearing from you.

If you agree, you can sign it here.

After a Skype conversation with Nico Andreas Heller, promoter of the initiative and founding director of the Democracy School, I found out that this petition is the tip of the iceberg of a wider process, aimed at creating an International Committee of Refugees (ICR), a directly elected, democratically accountable, representative body for internally displaced persons, refugees and people living in exile.

The challenge is tremendous: refugee camps host people from different cultures, religions, life experiences and many of them could have no experience of democracy at all (or don’t buy my or your idea of democracy).

They escape from different realities and for different reasons. They are over 65 millions nowadays and this number could increase over time as it is very possible to imagine climate refugees in the next future, fleeing from extreme climate events.

How the population of a camp could be represented? How the camp could have some kind of self-government to manage its specific needs and solve its internal problems? How the global population of refugees could dialogue with states and international fora – the UN in the first place – about their future?

From a strictly legal point of view, we need to consider that individuals are not unanimously considered subjects of international law, they cannot create an international organization, but just a non-governmental organization (NGO). They cannot dialogue on equal footing with states and international organizations but just enjoy – here and there – a limited observer status.

Nonetheless, an International Committee of Refugees would give them the rights to be aknowledged and to be heard. Which seems to me the minimum threshold for global civic rights. The mobilisation to explore innovative solution is on its way, and we are all invited, you can join it here.

I want to mention another beautiful project, the Project Love  – promoted by the architect and life coach Gregorio Avanzini -intended to create a holistic and scalable solution for refugee camps which includes everything from meeting basic human needs ( nutritious food; clean water; shelter; health care; education; emotional support). This too is an open initiative and everybody could offer his/her own expertise to make a difference.

We cannot ignore that we are facing  “the worst refugee and humanitarian crisis since World War II”( quoting UN Secretary Ban Ki-Moon) and one of the biggest issues in the XXI Century. Denial will just make it bigger.

It’s time to consider people not just as part of the problem, but as part of the solution.

A Case-Study: The Greek Crisis.

Much has been written about the Greek crisis.

Below, some thoughts on this story seen through the glasses of democratic standards and  -specifically-  through the two lenses of the legitimacy and accountability (3D democracy vision)

The financial crisis, in Greece more than elsewhere, has highlighted the erosion of state sovereignty in key areas of typical citizen-state relationships such as the welfare system and the labor market, in which the need for choices perceived as legitimate – but also accountable – is crucial. Some fundamental rights have been touched, some less fundamental ones have been significantly reduced.

Decisions had been taken by top political bodies (Eurogroup, European Council)  and technocratic institutions (European Commissions, ECB, IMF). Let’s put aside for a moment the good intentions as  restoring sound public finances: the simple truth is that parliaments have been ignored. The Greek Parliament – of course- but also the European Parliament.

The issue regards also the method and not just the matter. The solution to the issue itself -austerity or not austerity- is strongly influenced by the method used as some institutions are more easily driven to deliver rigor than growth. Moreover, they lack the necessary legitimacy and accountability to deal with individuals’ rights.

Conditions were attached to the Greek loan facility – a package of bilateral loans by Euro area member States complemented by an IMF loan. Two intergovernmental agreements were signed and entrusted the Commission to manage the package under strict conditionality. A loan facility agreement was then signed by the Commission on behalf of the Euro area member States and by Greece. Next, the economic conditions were agreed on in a series of Memoranda.

Their respect of the rule of law as well as their compliance to the EU Treaty and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights couldn’t be assessed by the European Court of justice because of the widespread use of atypical legal acts as well as of their intergovernmental nature.

Why? Why the Eurogroup and the German Government had such a strong voice and the Court of Justice had not? Why the Parliaments were not in the debate? Why, even now, with a clear Greek vote legitimizing a different majority in the Parliament and a different vision we still see the old movie going on again and again?

Just follow the money…

Money is not from the EU, money comes from some European governments and from the International Monetary Fund . With some help from the ECB.

The EU budget is too tiny to cope with the crises: less than 1% of EU GDP. Moreover, the 28 EU countries were not all willing to contribute, so the Eurozone States had to manage the crisis on their own. They did it through intergovernmental agreements (as creating the ESM) and according bilateral loans. The IMF – traditionally leaded by an European-  was very sensitive to the problem (even too much, according to the BRICS).

And here comes the Troika…..

The Troika is nothing more than a committee of creditors, entrusted with the management of the loans. Of course it hasn’t any accountability. Its doubtful legitimacy and lack in transparency have been clearly pointed out by the European Parliament.

If we want to assess its accountability, we have to split it into its three components:

The European Commission is an accountable institution, it has to report to the EP, answer to MEPs’ written questions and could even be dismissed by the Parliament with a majority vote. The ECB too is subject to a monetary dialogue with the EP, even if less incisive than the dialogue the Commission has with the EP. Unfortunately, having them acting together confuses responsibilities and makes harder to assess the role of each institution for the decisions taken.

And then we have the IMF.

There is a story I want to tell you about the IMF in the Greek crisis:

In a IMF Country Report about Greece (June 2013) we can read that due to the process of fiscal consolidation  the country paid a too high a price in terms of social and economic losses: “Market confidence was not restored, the banking system lost 30 percent of its deposits, and the economy encountered a much deeper- than-expected recession with exceptionally high unemployment. Public debt remained too high and eventually had to be restructured, with collateral damage for bank balance sheets that were also weakened by the recession”.  The reports makes clear there were successes as well as “[N]otable failures” in the program.

This is somehow a progress in the culture of the institution: analyzing critically the consequences of their choices. For sure the establishment of an Independent Evaluation Office in 2001 contributed to such improvement. Nonetheless, who is politically responsible if a choice is reported wrong? are there any consequences? The answers are: 1) Nobody, 2) No.
A gap in accountability is more than evident.

There is much to say about the tangle of many potential conflicts of interests inside the Executive Board of the Fund and in the IMF itself that we cannot unravel all of them here (but we’ve done it elsewhere!).

What makes the Greek crisis an interesting case study -unfortunately for the Greek people- is that it makes clear that democracy matters. Beyond matters of principle.

What is also really sad (at least for me) is that Europe is losing its credibility over the Greek crisis.