THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AFTER THE CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED

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My latest book is out and, yes, this is the title…. and, yes, there are some lessons we have learned, even if some of us wouldn’t have waited so long… they were clear enough since the beginning.

The Economic and Monetary Union was an unfinished project already in the Maastricht Treaty. This was the topic of my first book!

Anyway, now, the evidence is there for everybody, impossible to deny.

The simple, plain truth is that we have in the Eurozone a monetary union (or, better, it is a monetary union), but we have nowhere an economic union. Yes, we have a customs union, a common market, and some important side policies, as common regulations on consumers and environment protection (which is great), but we don’t have any European fiscal policy, just a coordination of national ones. And we have a European tiny budget not up to the task of any reallocation or redistribution of resources, almost no tax harmonization, no European welfare and even less hope to save a State risking default. Every financial intervention to rescue the states in crisis was an attempt to cope with this lack of competence and tools. Sometimes it worked, but, even then, it was too little too late.

In my new book, I try to describe – as clearly as possible – the Maastricht compromise: a monetary union without fiscal union, somehow replaced by a set of budget constraints intended to keep the budgets under control but, still, fully national. Then, I analyze the rules and regulations adopted after 2010 to face the crisis and the evolution of the role of the ECB. Finally, I explore the possible solutions: the reforms which would make the Union (or the Eurozone) a fiscal union. Some of them have been suggested by institutions, experts, and academicians, some are just my attempts to connect the dots…

This is the flyer of the book, available, for now, only in Italian

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And this is the English translation of the TOC, I hope there will be soon an English edition:

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION AFTER THE CRISIS: LESSONS LEARNED

INTRODUCTION

The crisis of the law and the law of the crisis

Chapter I: THE UNFINISHED MONETARY UNION

  1. At the origins of the Maastricht agreements.
  2. The dichotomy of models for economic and monetary policies.
  3. The regulatory model of economic policy: reasons and limits:
  4. a) the coordination of economic policies;
  5. b) the code of conduct;
  6. c) the principle of “no bail out”.
  7. The institutional model of monetary policy:
  8. a) the reasons for monetary unification;
  9. b) the European Central Bank;
  10. c) independence and a strict mandate.

 

Chapter II: THE CRISIS AND THE EMERGENCY SOLUTIONS

  1. The global financial crisis and its European edition.
  2. The heterogeneity of policy instruments.
  3. The verticalization of politics and the intergovernmental management of the crisis.
  4. The impact on the democratic principles of the Union and of the Member States.

 

Chapter III: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROLE OF THE ECB

  1. The European Union is not an optimal currency area
  2. The ECB’s intervention in the crisis.
  3. The controversial legitimacy of its tools and the intervention of the EU Court of Justice.
  4. The role of a central bank: technocracy vs democracy

 

Chapter IV: THE MISSING TILE: THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE MONETARY UNION

  1. Europe’s role in global economic governance;
  2. The European Union and the euro area in the Bretton Woods institutions;
  3. The European participation in the groups of states;
  4. Who represents Europe?

Chapter V: REFORMS ON THE WAY, REFORMS NEEDED

  1. Two paths for reform: Rethinking the regulatory model of economic policy and making the Eurozone an optimal currency area;
  2. A Treasury and a Minister in charge for it;
  3. A European budget;
  4. Real own resources;
  5. Adjustment mechanisms for an optimal currency area:
  6. a) taxation;
  7. b) welfare;
  8. c) free movement of people

Chapter VI: THE DIFFICULT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE EURO AREA

  1. common and conflicting interests and goals;
  2. The unity of the institutional framework and its limits;
  3. How to stay together while respecting different views
  4. Possible scenarios after the Brexit

CONCLUSIONS

What if an economic union is also a good reason for a supranational democracy?

APPENDIX

A proposal: the European Agency for sustainable growth.

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